Why Protect a Wealthy South Korea from a Nuclear North Korea?
Introduction: A Dangerous Question in a Changing Asia
Amid global turmoil—from Eastern Europe to the Middle East—Washington finds itself confronting another brewing flashpoint: the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has formally abandoned any pretense of peaceful reunification with the South, declaring the Republic of Korea (ROK) its “principal enemy.” Its leader, Kim Jong-un, has accelerated missile testing, including five intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches in a single year.
The implications are clear. North Korea’s ICBM program is designed for one purpose—to give Pyongyang the capability to threaten the U.S. homeland with nuclear destruction. As the North’s nuclear capacity grows, America’s longstanding defense commitment to South Korea demands renewed scrutiny.
Why should the United States, a debt-laden superpower, risk annihilation to protect one of the world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations?
From “Shrimp Among Whales” to Economic Giant
For centuries, Korea was the “shrimp among whales,” squeezed by China, Japan, and Russia. After Japan’s defeat in World War II, the peninsula was divided at the 38th parallel, with the Soviet Union occupying the North and the U.S. the South.
Two competing states emerged in 1948: the communist Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) under Kim Il-sung, and the capitalist Republic of Korea (ROK).
Initially, South Korea was impoverished and unstable. The U.S. withdrew most of its troops and refused to arm Seoul heavily, fearing President Syngman Rhee might invade the North. Kim Il-sung seized the opportunity, invading in June 1950 with Stalin’s approval. The ensuing Korean War killed millions, drew in the U.S. and China, and ended in a bloody stalemate.
The U.S. left behind a “mutual defense treaty” and a permanent troop presence—commitments that remain more than seventy years later.
The Rise of the South and the Stagnation of the North
In the decades following the war, South Korea’s transformation was extraordinary. Under the authoritarian leadership of Park Chung-hee, Seoul launched rapid industrialization, creating one of the most dynamic economies in the world.
By contrast, the North stagnated under Kim Il-sung’s totalitarian regime. When journalist Doug Bandow visited Pyongyang in 1992, he found an eerie, lifeless city—roads without cars, offices covered in propaganda, and citizens stripped of freedom. Even today, North Korea ranks near the bottom of every global human rights index.
South Korea now boasts a GDP roughly fifty times larger than the North’s and a population twice as large. Yet, despite its immense wealth and technological sophistication, Seoul continues to rely on the U.S. military for defense—a dependency that made sense in 1953 but not in 2025.
Trump’s Challenge to the Old Order
Until Donald Trump’s presidency, no major American leader dared to question this arrangement. Trump broke with tradition, arguing that wealthy allies should shoulder more of their own defense costs.
His suggestion—that South Korea use its vast resources and manpower to defend itself rather than depend on American protection—was met with outrage in Washington and Seoul alike. The U.S. foreign policy establishment treated his proposal as heresy, despite its logic in a post–Cold War world.
North Korea’s Nuclear Rise: From Dream to Deterrent
The first whispers of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions began in the early 1990s. After Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994, his son Kim Jong-il accelerated nuclear and missile development, seeing nuclear weapons as essential for regime survival.
By the time Kim Jong-un inherited power in 2011, the North’s nuclear program was well entrenched. Many analysts initially dismissed him as inexperienced and weak—but Kim quickly consolidated power, executing rivals and even assassinating his own relatives.
Today, North Korea possesses enough fissile material for 45–55 nuclear weapons, possibly more. The Asan Institute and RAND Corporation estimate that by the end of the decade, the DPRK could hold as many as 242 warheads—more than the UK, India, or Pakistan.
Kim is also diversifying his arsenal with tactical nukes, submarine-launched missiles, and long-range ICBMs capable of striking the continental U.S. His rhetoric is equally alarming: in 2022, North Korea’s legislature declared the country’s nuclear status “irreversible.”
The Strategic Dilemma: Deterrence or Disaster?
The central paradox of deterrence remains unchanged since the Cold War. As Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling explained, mutual vulnerability discourages preemptive attacks—because striking first could mean national suicide.
But deterrence can fail when one side fears its arsenal might be destroyed before use. For Kim Jong-un, the logic is chillingly simple: “use it or lose it.”
If Pyongyang believes a U.S.-ROK strike is imminent, it might launch first—turning the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear wasteland.
America’s Expanding Risk
In the past, defending South Korea carried manageable costs. Any war would devastate the peninsula but leave the American homeland untouched.
Now, with ICBMs that can reach Los Angeles or Chicago, that calculation has changed dramatically. The United States would be defending Seoul at the risk of its own destruction.
This growing danger exposes a critical weakness in the U.S. policy of extended deterrence—the promise to use nuclear weapons to defend allies. As Pyongyang’s capabilities expand, the credibility of that promise shrinks.
The Washington Declaration and Its Fragile Credibility
In April 2023, President Joe Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol reaffirmed their nuclear alliance through the Washington Declaration, pledging that any North Korean nuclear attack would “result in the end” of Kim’s regime.
Yet, such statements ring increasingly hollow. Would any American president truly risk the annihilation of U.S. cities for Seoul?
South Koreans seem unconvinced. Polls show overwhelming public support for developing an independent nuclear deterrent, a position gaining traction even among political elites. President Yoon himself hinted that Seoul might one day “build its own nuclear weapons” if the threat continues to grow.
Should South Korea Build the Bomb?
Allowing South Korea to go nuclear would send shockwaves across Asia. China would fume, Japan might follow suit, and Australia could reconsider its own nuclear stance.
Yet, this outcome may be preferable to the alternative—continuing to expose the American homeland to nuclear risk on behalf of another nation. A South Korean nuclear arsenal could not only deter the North but also pressure China to rein in its rogue ally.
The real question is whether Washington is ready to accept a nuclear South Korea, as it once accepted India.
The Illusion of Denuclearization
U.S. policymakers still cling to the fantasy of “complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement” (CVID) of North Korea’s arsenal. But after decades of failed negotiations, it’s clear that Pyongyang will not disarm voluntarily.
South Africa remains the only nation ever to give up its nuclear weapons—and it had only six. The idea that the Kim dynasty would abandon the only thing ensuring its survival is pure wishful thinking.
A more realistic approach would be arms control—negotiating limits rather than elimination. While imperfect, this strategy could reduce risk and buy time, much as U.S.-Soviet arms treaties did during the Cold War.
China, Russia, and the Shifting Balance
China once treated Kim Jong-un as an inconvenient neighbor, preferring stable relations with Seoul. That changed when Donald Trump courted Kim directly, prompting Beijing to reengage. Kim and Xi Jinping met five times between 2018 and 2019.
More recently, North Korea’s growing alignment with Russia—especially through arms sales for the Ukraine war—has unsettled Beijing. The Kim regime, backed by both Moscow and Beijing at different times, has mastered the art of playing great powers against one another.
Ironically, Pyongyang’s nukes not only deter the U.S. but also give it leverage over its supposed allies.
The Economic Burden of Global “Leadership”
The U.S. currently spends more on defense than the next ten nations combined, while carrying over $34 trillion in national debt. With an aging population and mounting domestic needs, Washington can no longer afford to subsidize the defense of wealthy allies indefinitely.
The Korean Peninsula, though strategically important during the Cold War, is now an unnecessary drain on American resources. South Korea, with its advanced military and world-class economy, is more than capable of defending itself.
As the U.S. faces growing fiscal constraints, retrenchment is not isolationism—it is realism.
Returning to Constitutional Principles
America’s founders envisioned a republic that defended its own people and territory, not a globe-spanning empire of alliances. In his Farewell Address, George Washington warned against “a passionate attachment of one nation for another,” which could drag the U.S. into “quarrels and wars without sufficient inducement or justification.”
That wisdom rings louder than ever in the nuclear age.
Defending South Korea at the potential cost of American cities is not a moral or strategic necessity—it is a perilous indulgence rooted in inertia and habit.
Conclusion: Time to Let Allies Stand on Their Own
North Korea’s growing nuclear power has transformed the Korean question from a regional issue into a global risk. Every ICBM launch tightens the nuclear noose around Washington’s neck.
For seventy years, America’s presence in Korea has preserved peace. But what once made sense in 1953 no longer does in 2025. South Korea is strong, democratic, and wealthy. It no longer needs to be defended like a dependent.
The time has come for the United States to transfer security responsibilities back to its allies—starting with South Korea. Doing so would not only strengthen global stability but also restore America’s focus on its own defense, prosperity, and constitutional purpose.
As history has shown, the most dangerous commitments are those we maintain simply because we always have.
